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The Management of Third-Party Amicus Participation before International 
Criminal Tribunals: Juggling Efficiency and Legitimacy 
 
Introduction:  
 
The management of third-party amicus participation before international courts and tribunals 
is often conceived of as a trade-off between legitimacy and efficiency. A standard narrative is 
that third-party amici generate administrative burdens, but their participation may enhance the 
legitimacy of the process in cases that have societal ramifications that extend beyond the 
narrow concerns of the parties. The more nuanced reality is that, depending on how third-party 
amicus participation is managed, it has the potential to enhance or undermine both the 
efficiency and the legitimacy of the proceedings. International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) 
provide a rich body of evidence for the analysis of this phenomenon.  
Our paper will review the practice of third-party amicus participation before ICTs and consider 
its impact on the efficiency and legitimacy of the international criminal process. We conceive 
of ‘legitimacy’ as a ‘sociological’ quality, derived from the actual and perceived fairness of the 
proceedings, rather than from the formal source of an ICT’s authority. Our conception of 
‘efficiency’ is based on a more prosaic dictionary definition: ‘the ability to do something or 
produce something without wasting materials, time, or energy’. Against that conceptual 
backdrop our review will focus on the provenance of third-party interventions, their nature and 
their impact (if any) on the reasoning of the ICT in a given case.  
Our findings suggest that a significant proportion of third-party amicus submissions before 
ICTs are from western NGOs and individuals. We will consider the implications of this in light 
of the North/South tensions that exist in the field of international criminal law. Could a lack of 
diversity among third-party amici encourage criticism that proceedings before ICTs are, or 
appear to be, unfairly skewed in favour of western interests? If the ICC’s caseload is focused 
on Africa, does legitimacy demand that the third-party amici who give voice to the public 
interest be drawn – at least to some extent – from sectors of the African public? Can third-party 
amicus participation be harnessed in such a way as to improve the efficiency of the proceedings 
(e.g. through the use of solicited expert submissions)?  
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Our paper is organised as follows: 
In Section I we set out our conceptual framework, drawing heavily on the work of other 
scholars. We concentrate in particular on a concept of ‘sociological legitimacy’ that serves as 
a useful lens through which to view the work of international institutions. This leads into a 
discussion of the way in which international courts and tribunals are required to juggle the twin 
(and sometimes competing) imperatives of legitimacy and efficiency. We then consider the 
role that third-party amici play in this context, and the challenge of ‘representativeness’ that 
has arisen in certain forums – most notably WTO dispute settlement – where third-party amicus 
participation has been curtailed due to the perception that amici were pursuing narrow agendas 
and vested interests.  
In Section II we examine the practice of third-party amici before ICTs. We look here at the 
regulatory frameworks that prevail in the various ICTs; at the quantitative data (number of 
submissions, from whom, etc); and at various case studies in which ICTs have engaged with 
third-party amici in interesting ways.  
In Section III we discuss the implications of our empirical findings. We conclude that while 
there appears to be a diversity deficit among third-party amici in ICTs, it is not overwhelming, 
and the participation of these actors tends to be managed fairly judiciously. The third-party 
amici who receive most attention in the decisions of ICTs tend to be academic experts 
intervening to offer their opinions on points of law. The interventions of NGOs are occasionally 
relied on, but there is little evidence that these interventions are being used as vehicles for the 
pursuit of narrow agendas and vested interests.  
To the extent that the ‘representativeness’ of third-party amici is a problem in ICTs, there is no 
obvious procedural panacea. The issue has deep structural roots and the solution may lie in the 
strengthening of civil society in the Global South. Nevertheless, when it comes to juggling the 
twin imperatives of efficiency and legitimacy, we observe that some procedural models for 
managing third-party amici are better than others. In our final comments we evaluate which 
models are best suited to encouraging amicus submissions that are: (a) helpful to judges for the 
determination of cases within ICTs; and (b) broadly representative of the public whose interests 
the submissions sometimes purport to give voice to. 
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I. ‘Legitimacy’ and ICTs 
A. ‘Legitimacy’ 
Much ink has been spilt over the slippery concept of ‘legitimacy’ in the context of international 
institutions.  
Fallon provides a useful general starting point. He describes three concepts of legitimacy: legal, 
sociological and moral.1  ‘Legal’ legitimacy, he explains, is judged by what is legal and what 
is not.2 The ‘sociological’ legitimacy of institutions and norms, on the other hand, is defined 
according to the manner in which a certain, relevant public perceives a norm or an institution, 
and whether this norm or institution is regarded “as justified, appropriate, or otherwise 
deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”3 
‘Moral’ legitimacy “is a function of moral justifiability or respect-worthiness.”4 Accordingly, 
a norm or institution may rest on proper legal foundations and enjoy broad public support, but 
nevertheless be regarded as morally corrupt and thus lacking ‘moral’ legitimacy.  
Authors focusing specifically on the work of ICTs have also drawn on the concept of 
‘legitimacy’.5 Their focus tends to be on what Fallon would call the ‘sociological’ aspect of 
legitimacy. According to Luban, for instance, the legitimacy of ICTs is derived “not from the 
shaky political authority that creates them, but from the manifested fairness of their procedures 
and punishments.”6 He claims that ICTs must deliver “champagne-quality due process” in 
order to be considered as ‘legitimate’.7  
In a similar vein, Murphy stresses the importance of appearance and perception in the context 
of ‘legitimacy’:8 
                                                          
1 Richard Fallon, “Legitimacy and the constitution” (2005) 118(6) Harvard Law Review 1787 [Fallon].  
2 Ibid 1794.  
3 Ibid 1795.  
4 Ibid 1796.  
5 See for example Margaret deGuzman, “Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court” (2008) 
32(5) Fordham International Law Journal 1400 [deGuzman]; Marlies Glasius, “Do International Criminal Courts 
require democratic legitimacy?” (2012) 23(1) The European Journal of Internatioanl Law 43; Hitomi Takemura, 
“Reconsidering the meaning and actuality of the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court” (2012) 4(2) 
Amsterdam Law Forum [Takemura]; Luban, infra note 6; Murphy, infra note 8; Danner, infra note 12. 
6 David Luban, “Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law” 
(2008) Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No 1154117 [Luban] at 14. 
7 Luban, ibid 14-15; See also other authors, like Grier Ulfstein, “International courts and judges: independence, 
interaction and legitimacy” (2013-2014) New York Journal of International Law and Politics 849 [Ulfstein] at 
864-865.  
8 Sean Murphy, “Aggression. Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court” (2010) 20(4) The European 
Journal of International Law 1147 [Murphy] at 1148.  
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“[T]he ICC (and its half-sibling ad hoc international criminal tribunals) depends heavily 
on the perception of its authority to galvanize the support of states and non-state actors. 
Without that support, the ability of the ICC to investigate suspects, to take into custody 
indictees, and to issue authoritative decisions will be severely inhibited, if not crippled.” 
Drawing on Franck’s work on legitimacy in international institutions, Murphy adds that the 
legitimacy of institutions like ICTs is tightly related to compliance: “Where an international 
rule or institution lacked legitimacy, its ‘compliance pull’ would be very weak.”9  
We adopt a similar approach in the present article, drawing on a ‘sociological’ concept of 
legitimacy in order to determine the impact that the interventions of third-party amici have on 
the legitimacy of ICTs. We submit that this requires particular attention to be paid to the impact 
of amicus interventions on the communities most closely affected by the work of ICTs. In 
taking this line we are following a fairly well trodden path. 
Shany, for example, points to instances where a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of local 
communities has frustrated the work of ICTs.10 Hobbs, for his part, connects the sociological 
legitimacy of ICTs with the procedural principle of ‘fair reflection’, according to which the 
composition of ICTs should reflect the societies that are directly affected by these courts.11 
The ICC in particular tends to be criticised for being ‘remote from ... the places where the 
crimes it adjudicates occur’.12 Hornsby sums up the ICC’s ‘image problem’ in Africa thus:13 
“Perceptions that this important international institution discriminates and 
disproportionately focuses on Africa, African leaders, and African related human rights 
abuses exist and need to be addressed.” 
                                                          
9 Murphy, ibid at 1148.  
10 Yuval Shany, “How can international criminal courts have a greater impact on national criminal proceedings? 
Lessons from the first two decades of international criminal justice in operation” (2013) 46(3) Israel Law Review 
431 [Shany] at 449-450. 
11 Harry Hobbs, “Hybrid Tribunals and the composition of the court: In search of sociological legitimacy” (2016) 
16(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 484 [Hobbs] at 487; Samantha Besson, “Legal philosophical issues 
of international adjudication: Getting over the amour impossible between international law and adjudication” in 
Romano, Alter & Shany, (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP, 2013) at 431-432. 
12 Allison Marston Danner, “Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion at the 
International Criminal Court” (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 510 [Danner] at 10.  
13 David Hornsby, “The International Criminal Court in Africa: A crisis of legitimacy?” (2015) opencanada.org, 
available online: https://www.opencanada.org/features/the-international-criminal-court-in-africa-a-crisis-of-
legitimacy/  
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A common theme that emerges from some of these critiques is that the legitimacy of 
international courts in general (and ICTs in particular) is tied to the quality of procedural justice 
these institutions mete out, which is in turn linked to some extent to the question of 
‘representativeness’, or the manner in which affected communities are involved in the legal 
proceedings. 14 Much discussion turns on questions relating to the composition of the judiciary 
in ICTs,15 or the geographical location of ICTs. For example, Shany questions the wisdom of 
the decision not to appoint Rwandan judges to the ICTR, as well as the fact that ICTR and 
ICTY proceedings were not held in Rwanda or in the affected Balkan states.16 He concludes as 
follows:17 
“Strengthening the ties between the international criminal courts and local communities 
could have improved the local degree of acquaintance with the courts and their work, 
and increase faith in their potential ability to serve the interests of justice. It could have 
further underscored for judges and other court officials the existence of an important 
domestic audience for their decisions.” 
Indeed, formative decisions in the establishment of the ICTR – such as the decision locate the 
tribunal and incarceration facilities away from Rwanda – contributed towards a perception 
within Rwanda that the ICTR was remote, and have been cited among the reasons for Rwanda’s 
decision to vote against the Tribunal’s establishment.18 When it comes to the ICTY, the 
Tribunal’s legacy has been undermined, perhaps fatally so, by the absence of ‘buy in’ among 
local communities, as vividly illustrated by Milanovic.19  
                                                          
14 The connection between procedural rules and the legitimacy of international courts was stressed more generally 
by Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke: “We understand developments in rules of procedure with regard to 
more transparency and opportunities of participation as an expression of the changing conception of international 
decisions and as part of attempts that aim at strengthening the capacity of legitimation that is nested in the judicial 
process itself.” See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke “In whose name? An investigation of international 
courts’ public authority and its democratic justification” (2012) 23(1) The European Journal of International Law 
7 [von Bogdandy & Venzke] at 25; see also Grossman, infra note 24.  
15 Hobbs, supra note 11 at 487. 
16 Shany, supra note 10 at 450. 
17 Shany, supra note 10 at 450. 
18 Catherine Cisse, “The end of a Culture of Impunity in Rwanda? Prosecution of Genocide and War Crimes 
before Rwandan Courts and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda” (1998) 1(1) Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 161, at 163-164. 
19 Marko Milanovic, “The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugloslavia: An Anticipatory Post-Mortem’ AJIL 
(forthcoming): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755505; and, of particular relevance to the 
present discussion: “Establishing the Facts about Mass Atrocities: Accounting for the Failure of the ICTY to 
Persuade Target Audiences” Georgetown Journal of International Law (forthcoming): 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757151.  
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The problem is arguably inherent in any attempt to dispense transitional justice. The diverse 
array of stakeholders includes – in addition to the types of parties that participate in normal 
criminal proceedings – the communities that have been torn apart by the acts that ICTs have 
been set up to deal with, and the international actors whose efforts (and money) have gone into 
establishing the process. Local concerns and sensibilities have arguably not always be given 
the attention they deserve, and some commentators have been critical of the way they have 
been overlooked. Refik Hodzic is particularly scathing: 
The ICTY has never truly made a commitment to the people of the former Yugoslavia 
… because, simply, it has never seen them as its primary constituency. Instead, to the 
vast majority of judges and lawyers who shaped its development and jurisprudence, 
they remained merely the objects of Tribunal’s cases, while the only people they saw 
themselves accountable to were the policymakers in New York, Washington, Berlin 
and other key capitals ...20    
Others, like Haslam, have argued that in order to ‘operate in a meaningful way’ the ICTR 
needed to be ‘responsive to civil society claims’.21 
Against a backdrop of local hostility (at worst) or indifference and misunderstanding (at best) 
concerning the activities of ICTs, third-party amici may have a valuable role to play in 
proceedings, in the sense that they are potentially in a position to give voice to the interests of 
constituencies who are affected by the work of an ICT but are not directly participating in 
proceedings. With this in mind, we wish to suggest in this article that it is worth considering 
the ‘representativeness’ of third-party amici, especially those who purport to give voice to the 
public interest, as this can impact on the overall perception of the legitimacy of the procedural 
justice meted out by ICTs.  
B. Legitimacy, efficiency and amicus participation 
Third-party amicus participation is becoming increasingly popular in domestic22 and 
international23 litigation. This trend is reflected in the practice of ICTs.24 The question of how 
                                                          
20 Cited (with approval) by Milanovic in the GJIL paper, ibid at 46.  
21 Emily Haslam, “Law, Civil Society and Contested Justice” in M-E Dembour and T Kelly (eds) Paths to 
International Justice: Social and Legal Perspectives (CUP 2007) 58-9. She argues (at 61-62) that amici can play 
an important role in bringing a ‘broader range of voices’ before the court.  
22 See a description of these phenomena, including data, in Avidan Kent & Jamie Trinidad, “International law 
scholars as amici curiae: An emerging dialogue (of the deaf)?”, 29:4 Leiden Journal of International Law 
(forthcoming, 2016), [Kent & Trinidad] 23.  
23 See ibid for a more detailed review of the term ‘amicus’, as well as the increase in amicus participation in 
domestic and international litigation.  
24 The rules and approaches of international courts range between the rather limited model of the ICJ, to the ultra-
permissive approach of the IACtHR. For a complete review see Bartholomeusz, infra note 35. 
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amicus submissions are impacting on the work of ICTs is therefore a matter of increasing 
importance.  
It is often argued that amicus participation promotes values like openness, transparency and 
inclusiveness, and therefore a priori enhances the legitimacy of international courts and 
tribunals.25 On such a view, the main barriers to amicus participation are the time and cost of 
processing third-party submissions, which place burdens on court registries, judges and parties.  
The weight attached to such ‘efficiency’ concerns can be significant. Indeed, in the case of 
contentious proceedings in the ICJ, efficiency concerns are determinative. The World Court’s 
refusal to accept such submissions derives from its desire to avoid having to deal with a ‘vast 
amount of unwanted proffered assistance’.26   Even in advisory cases the Court is reticent, and 
it is easy to understand why. In the advisory proceedings on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons 
for example, the ICJ received ‘thousands of letters’ from third parties “appealing both to the 
Members’ conscience and to the public conscience”.27 A more liberal approach towards the 
acceptance of amicus briefs may well have resulted in that case in the submission of thousands 
of amicus briefs, and a major – debilitating – administrative headache.   
Nevertheless, when it comes to forums that are more open towards amicus participation, the 
view is often expressed that as long as the ‘efficiency’ burdens are properly managed, the net 
contribution of third-party amici is to enhance the legitimacy of proceedings. Distinguished 
authors have taken this line in relation to, inter alia, the WTO dispute resolution system28 and 
the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Process (ISDS):29 According to the ICSID Suez 
Tribunal:30 
                                                          
25 See for example Nienke Grossman, “The Normative legitimacy of international courts” (2013) 86 Temple Law 
Review 61 [Grossman].  
26 See the relevant correspondence; Letter from Professor WM Reisman to the Registrar, 10 September 1970, ICJ 
Pleadings 1971, Vol. II, 636; Letter from the Registrar to Professor Reisman, 6 November 1970, ICJ Pleadings 
1971, Vol. II, at 638, at 638-639. 
27 Emphasis supplied, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Guillaume [1996] at 287. 
28 Marceau and Hurley. 
29 Emphasis supplied. Eric De Brabandere “NGOs and the “public interest”: The legality and rationale of amicus 
curiae interventions in international economic and investment disputes” (2011) 12(1) Chicago Journal of 
International Law 85 [De Brabandere]; One of the present authors has also made a connection between the ISDS’ 
legitimacy and amicus participation, see Avidan Kent, “The principle of public participation in NAFTA Chapter 
11 Disputes” in Hoi Kong & Kinvin Wroth, NAFTA and sustainable development: History, experience and 
prospects for reform (CUP, 2015) [Kent]; Avidan Kent, “Renewable energy disputes before international 
economic tribunals: A case for institutional ‘greening’?” (2015) 12(3) Transnational Dispute Management.   
30 Emphasis is not in the origin. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and 
Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005), at para 22. 
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“The acceptance of amicus submissions would have the additional desirable 
consequence of increasing the transparency of investor-state arbitration. Public 
acceptance of the legitimacy of international arbitral processes, particularly when they 
involve states and matters of public interest, is strengthened by increased openness and 
increased knowledge as to how these processes function.” 
The ICC’s first prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, while not referring explicitly to amici, has 
argued in relation to third-party involvement with the work of the Court that:31  
“transparency and consistency in our work will ensure our legitimacy, and help to 
increase other actors’ commitment to, and cooperation with, the Court and the OTP.” 
In our submission, such views tend to gloss over the problem of ‘representativeness’ that we 
identified earlier. Amici before ICTs (especially NGO amici) may claim to be voice-pieces for 
affected communities but, like judges in ICTs, they are not always the products of those 
communities. Claims by amici that they are giving voice to the interests of affected 
communities should not be accepted at face value. The experience of the WTO dispute 
resolution regime suggests that ICTs should at least be alert to the possibility that the 
interventions of third-party amici may be helping to fuel a ‘representativeness deficit’.  
Despite lofty proclamations that ‘open[ing] the door to public observation and participation’ 
was necessary to ‘maintain legitimacy’, the WTO today adopts a highly restrictive approach 
towards the participation of amici curiae in the resolution of disputes.32 This approach stems in 
large part from the perception among developing states that in practice, the amici with the 
financial means to intervene in proceedings tend to represent the interests of western civil 
society, to the detriment of developing states.33 There is also widespread suspicion within the 
WTO regime that western amici often serve as vehicles for the promotion of narrow vested 
commercial interests.34 
                                                          
31 Emphasis supplied. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, “The Tenth Anniversary of the ICC and Challenges for the Future: 
Implementing the law” Speech, London School of Economics, available online: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/assets/richmedia/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/transcripts/20081007_LuisMorenoOc
ampo_tr.pdf .  
32 Emphasis supplied. Gabrielle Marceau & Mikella Hurley, “Transparency and Public Participation in the WTO: 
A report card on WTO transparency mechanisms” (2012) 4(1) Trade Law & Development 19 [Marceau & Hurley] 
at 36. 
33 WTO, “Minutes of meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 23 October 2002” WTO Doc. 
WT/DSB/M/134 [WTO minutes 2002] at para 63. 
34 Reported comments of Brazil, WTO minutes 2002, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at para 71. 
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Such concerns go beyond straightforward conflicts of interest of the type that international 
courts and tribunals are required to deal with from time to time (the Gotovina & Markac case 
in the ICTY provides an obvious example of a straightforward conflict of interest, where a 
request to intervene was refused due to the fact, inter alia, that one of the would-be amici had 
a previous association with the defence team and that the ICTY therefore had “concerns about 
the objectivity of the Proposed Amicus Curiae”).35 ‘Representativeness’, as a component of 
legitimacy, turns on a broader perception of things, across a number of different constituencies. 
The identities of third-party amici, and the type of arguments they make when purporting to 
give voice to the public interest, are therefore of some relevance.  
Following an extensive review of the practice of amicus participation before a variety of 
international courts and tribunals, Bartholomeusz concludes cautiously that “[i]t may be that 
wider participation in international jurisdictions’ proceedings promotes their legitimacy, at 
least among those seeking to participate.”36 In so concluding, he offers the important insight 
that the same action could enhance the sociological legitimacy of an institution in the eyes of 
some groups (e.g. civil society organizations), and reduce it in the eyes of others (e.g. 
governments).37 This, we submit, is crucial.  
In the following section we review the practice of amicus participation in ICTs in light of the 
conceptual framework we have outlined in this section. This is impossible to do 
comprehensively without adopting a rather ‘broad brush’ approach. Our intention, after setting 
out the procedural rules governing amicus participation before ICTs, is to identify the 
provenance of the interventions and discuss their impact.  
II. THIRD-PARTY AMICI IN ICTs 
 
A. The procedural rules 
The procedural rules concerning amicus participation in proceedings before ICTs are short and 
open-ended, especially when compared with those of other international tribunals. The 
                                                          
35 Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac, (Decision on the application and proposed amicus curiae 
brief) (2012) Case No. IT-06-90-A at para 12. 
36 Emphasis supplied. Lance Bartholomeusz, “The Amicus Curiae before international courts and tribunals” 
(2005) 5 Non-State Actors and International Law 209 [Bartholomeusz] at 283 
37 Former President Gilbert Guillaume commented that states should be protected against ‘powerful pressure 
groups which besiege them today with the support of the mass media’. For that reason, he argued, that the ICJ 
should better ward off unwanted amicus curiae submissions.1 
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‘pioneer’ provision is Rule 74 of the ICTY Rules, reproduced identically in Rule 74 of the 
ICTR Rules.38 It states that: 
“A Chamber may, if it considers it desirable for the proper determination of the case, 
invite or grant leave to a State, organization or person to appear before it and make 
submissions on any issue specified by the Chamber.” 
Rule 103 of the ICC is a slightly modified, more elaborate version of the same rule:   
“1. At any stage of the proceedings, a Chamber may, if it considers it desirable for the 
proper determination of the case, invite or grant leave to a State, organization or person 
to submit, in writing or orally, any observation on any issue that the Chamber deems 
appropriate. 
2. The Prosecutor and the defence shall have the opportunity to respond to the 
observations submitted under sub-rule 1.  
3. A written observation submitted under sub-rule 1 shall be filed with the Registrar, 
who shall provide copies to the Prosecutor and the defence. The Chamber shall 
determine what time limits shall apply to the filing of such observations.” 
The rules of ‘hybrid’ criminal tribunals are also broadly similar. The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) for example, uses almost the same language as Rule 74 ICTY/ICTY described 
above.39 A very similar approach can be found in Rule 33 of ECCC’s Internal Rules and Rule 
131 of the Special Tribunal For Lebanon (STFL), the latter introducing an extra procedural 
layer in the form of an obligation to ‘hear the parties’ before approving a submission. 
The formal regulatory framework governing amicus participation in ICTs is therefore 
permissive – more so than, say, the NAFTA or UNCITRAL rules.40 Moreover, apparent 
restrictions in ICT rules tend not to be interpreted particularly strictly in practice. For instance, 
the ICTR/ICTY rule that amicus briefs may be submitted only “on any issue specified by the 
Chamber” would seem to imply on its face that the Chamber will only accept amicus 
submissions on issues it has previously specified. In practice however, it is clear that with rare 
                                                          
38 Also other tribunals like the Special Court for Sierra Leone adopted an almost identical provision.  
39 With one difference – the right to appear before the SCLS is omitted from Art 74 of the SCSL Rules. 
40 The rules concerning NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes (the NAFTA’s Statement of the Free Trade Commission 
on Non-Disputing Party Participation), as well as the recent (2014) UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty Based Investor-State Arbitration, include more specific restrictions on amici submissions, while the ICTs 
rules reviewed in this section includes almost no formal restrictions. See discussion below.   
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exceptions (see for example the Blaskic case discussed below) amici do not wait for the court 
to ‘specify’ issues but rather attempt to intervene on whatever issue they see fit. It is perhaps 
due to this practice that the later ICC Rules do not include the same limitation, and in fact 
‘reverse’ the order of things – the Court will decide whether the topic is appropriate only after 
reviewing the submission, rather than specifying in advance which topics merit submissions.   
While the rules of other courts and tribunals demand that amici demonstrate a “significant 
interest in the proceeding”,41 an “insight that is different from that of the disputing parties”, 
and on some occasions set limits concerning the length of these submissions;42 no such 
requirements can be found in the rules presented above.  
In 1997 the ICTY sought to flesh out the procedural requirements in a note innocuously entitled 
‘information concerning the submission of amicus curiae briefs’,43 which in fact contains some 
strong regulatory prescriptions. It provides for instance that amici should state their contact 
with any party to the case in order to prevent conflicts of interest,44 Furthermore, amici are also 
expressly limited to intervening on questions of law,45 a prescription that has served to ‘cull’ 
the number of potential amici.46 The Tribunal also reserves a right to set a page limit in order 
to prevent voluminous submissions.  
The way the amicus rules have been framed in ICTs suggests the framers shared a few basic 
presumptions. First, third-party amicus participation was to be treated as, basically, a good 
thing. Second, it is worth paying an ‘efficiency’ price in order to encourage amicus 
participation. Third, the rules should be flexible enough to allow ICTs a broad discretion, thus 
enabling them to manage these ‘efficiency’ concerns.  
This liberal approach arguably reflects the mood of the 1990s, when the international 
community was enthralled by the rise of the so-called ‘global civil society’.47 The sympathetic 
                                                          
41 See for example Rule 37(2) ICSID Rules. 
42 See for example Article 3(b) of the NAFTA’s Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing 
party participation. 
43 ICTY, “Information concerning the submission of amicus curiae briefs” (1997) IT/122, available online: 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Miscellaneous/it122_amicuscuriae_briefs_en.pdf  [ICTY 
Information note] 
44 Ibid Art 3(f). 
45 Ibid Art 3(b). 
46 See for example in Prosecutor vs Karadzic & Mladic, where the ICTY rejected a brief presented by a 
psychiatrist concerning  “the relationship between ethnic cleansing and psychiatric science”, as such did not 
comment on issues that are related to law.  
47 See for example the attention given to non-governmental organization in Agenda 21, adopted in the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit; a simple document search reveals that the term ‘non-governmental organizations’ is mentioned 
no less than 183 times in this document.  
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environment provided a fertile breeding ground for the self-appointed representatives of ‘global 
civil society’, whose funding increased and whose numbers proliferated.48 A received wisdom 
was established during this period which deemed public participation essential for closing a 
“democratic gap” in international law and politics, thus enhancing the legitimacy of 
international institutions.49 Against this backdrop, the eagerness of third-party amici to 
intervene before ICTs was perceived as basically a benevolent phenomenon, and the question 
of their ‘representativeness’ received scant attention. Having said that, the rules give ICTs the 
scope to reflect evolving concerns in their approach towards the management of amici. In the 
sections that follow we assess whether they do so in practice.  
B. The Practice  
 
As noted above, third-party amicus participation is on the increase in domestic50 and 
international51 litigation, a trend that is reflected in the practice of ICTs.52 NGOs, law schools’ 
clinics and academics are increasingly viewing amicus participation as a vehicle for promoting 
their agendas. In the UK and US courts the trend has been dramatic.53At the international level 
participation varies from forum to forum with some court, like the IACtHR and the ECtHR, 
receiving a disproportionate number of amicus briefs (the IACtHR for example, has received 
more than 500 amicus briefs since its establishment, mostly from NGOs, individuals, and law 
school clinics).54 
In seeking to identify trends in amicus practice before ICTs we have employed a rather crude 
methodology. We have relied on the search engines on the websites of ICTs and searched 
manually for as many examples of third-party amicus participation as we could find. It should 
be stressed that we are concerned exclusively with third-party amici – ostensibly independent, 
                                                          
48 See in Felix Dodds, Michael Strauss & Maurice Strong, The Only Earth: The long road via Rio to sustainable 
development (Routledge, 2012) at 230. 
49 See discussion in Karin Bäckstrand (2013) “Civil Society Participation in Sustainable Development 
Diplomacy. Toward Stakeholder Democracy”, Paper presented at the 8th pan-European Conference on 
International Relations, 18-22 September, 2013, Warsaw, Poland http://www.eisa-net.org/be-
bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/B%C3%A4ckstrandStakeholderDemocracyWarsaw2013.pdf  
50 See a description of these phenomena, including data, in Kent & Trinidad, supra note 22.  
51 ibid. 
52 The rules and approaches of international courts range between the rather limited model of the ICJ, to the ultra-
permissive approach of the IACtHR. For a complete review see Bartholomeusz, infra note 35. 
53 See a description of these phenomena, including data, in Kent & Trinidad, supra note 22.  
54 J Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (2nd ed. Cambridge 
University Press,2013) 72. For a list of amici appearing before the IACtHR, see F. Rivera Juaristi, ‘The Amicus 
Curiae in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1982-2013)’, SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488073 .   
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unattached interveners – not, for example, with court-appointed representatives of otherwise 
unrepresented defendants, to whom the ‘amicus’ label is also attached.55 We have tried to be 
as comprehensive as possible in our review of third-party amicus practice, but some instances 
of amicus participation may have slipped through the cracks. It is worth bearing in mind in this 
respect that attempts to intervene will not always be documented publicly. While we cannot 
therefore claim to have conducted an exhaustive survey of the practice, the data presented here 
is helpful when it comes to identifying broad patterns of participation.  
 
 (i) The Numbers 
We identified 46 amici submissions before the ICC, with amici attempting to intervene in 15 
out of 21 cases. 21 of the 46 amici came from the states in which the facts of the adjudicated 
dispute took place (i.e. ‘local’ amici), while 25 amici submissions were submitted by amici that 
were based in foreign states (i.e. ‘foreign’ amici). One case (Lubanga) attracted ten 
submissions – a disproportionately high number. 
In ICTR proceedings, there were 23 submissions from ‘local’ amici (ten of these coming from 
either the government of Rwanda or the Kigali Bar Association) and 20 submissions by foreign 
amici.  
In ICTY proceedings, 38 briefs were submitted by foreign amici and nine by local amici. The 
foreign/local gap is largely attributable to one case (Blaskic) in which 20 amicus submissions 
were made, 19 of which were by ‘foreign’ actors.  
The numbers therefore reveal that a significant (though not overwhelming) proportion of third-
party amicus interventions are by foreign actors. In and of itself, this does not tell us very much. 
It is certainly not sufficient to disclose the existence of a representativeness deficit. Field 
research would be required in order to gain a meaningful understanding of how these 
interventions are perceived among local communities, and that would take us beyond the 
confines of the present study. Nevertheless, a closer look at some instances of third-party 
amicus participation before ICTs yields some useful qualitative insights. Specifically, it is 
helpful to consider whether, and to what extent, third-party amicus submissions influence 
judicial decisions in ICTs.  
                                                          
55 See the detailed review of the term ‘amicus curiae’ in Kent & Trinidad, supra note 22.  
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(ii) The influence of third-party amici before ICTs 
Identifying ‘influence’ is a methodological minefield. It should be acknowledged from the 
outset that third party entities like governments and civil society organizations are able to 
influence the operation of ICTs in a variety of informal ways, and amicus submissions are only 
one strategy that they may adopt.56 Haslam describes for example one amicus (the Coalition 
for Woman’s Human Rights in Conflict Situation) that, despite being ignored by the Akayesu 
Tribunal, managed to influence the case through informal interactions with the ICTR 
prosecutor, which led eventually to the indictment being amended.57  
It should also be noted that the effect of an amicus intervention on a judge’s thinking may 
sometimes be subtle or not openly acknowledged, thus making it difficult to discern ‘influence’ 
from judgments and other court records (even when one reads between the lines).58 Judges are 
understandably reticent when it comes to discussing such matters, even off the record.   
Notwithstanding the above, there is some value in looking at what is actually said in decisions 
of ICTs. After all, the concept of sociological legitimacy that we articulated in Section I relates 
to the way things appear to be, not necessarily to the way things are. Two cases in particular 
stand out when it comes to visible influence: the Blaskic case59 (ICTY) and the Taylor case60 
(SCSL).  
In Blaskic, following an open solicitation of amicus briefs by the ICTY, no less than 20 amici 
attempted to intervene.61 Their submissions touched almost exclusively on matters of law, 
notably on the ICTY’s power to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign state or to 
governmental officials, and the appropriate remedies in the case of non-compliance with such 
an order.62 These attempts were undoubtedly influential. The ICTY relied on,63 and engaged 
                                                          
56 Emily Haslam, “Law, civil society and contested justice at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda” In 
Marie-Bénédicte Dembour & Tobias Kelly (eds.) Paths to International Justice (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) [Haslam].  
57 Haslam, ibid 61-62.  
58 Haslam, ibid 56 at 61.  
59 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic (Judgement on the request of the Republic of Croatia for review of the decision 
of trial chamber II of 18 July 1997) (1997) Case No. IT-95-1 [Blaskic]. 
60 Prosecutor v. Taylor (Charles Ghankay), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Case No SCSL2003-01-I, 
SCSL-03-01-I-059, ICL 25 (SCSL 2004), 31st May 2004, Appeals Chamber (SCSL) [Taylor]. 
61 Blaskic, supra note 59 para 10. 
62 Blaskic, supra note 59. 
63 The ICTY cited the amici 11 times in its decision, Blaskic, supra note 59, in footnotes 20-22, 38, 49, 61, 64, 
71, 74, 75, 79, 101. 
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with64 the amicus submissions in its decision to a considerable extent. Indeed the Tribunal’s 
decision is peppered with phrases such as “as suggested by the amicus…”,65 and, “as 
demonstrated in the valuable survey submitted by amicus curiae…”66, all of which indicate that 
the Tribunal not only relied heavily on these submissions but was also keen to acknowledge 
openly that it had done so.67    
In Taylor68, the SCSL reviewed the submissions of three amici in detail. The submissions of 
two of the amici (Professors Sands and Orentlicher) had been solicited directly by the SCSL, 
so it is hardly surprising that the Court relied on these submissions explicitly. Indeed, it went 
so far as to adopt the conclusions of these two amici as its own,69and was quite open about this 
being reflected in the record: 
“For the reasons that have been given, it is not difficult to accept and gratefully adopt 
the conclusions reached by Professor Sands who assisted the court as amicus curiae.”70 
Other examples exist of visible reliance on amicus submissions. In the Tadic case (ICTY) for 
example, the contribution of one amicus (Professor Christine Chinkin71) was acknowledged,72 
cited, and relied on by the Tribunal with respect to several issues.73  
In the Kayishema case,74 the ICTR chose openly to rely on and accept the arguments of several 
amici (including Human Rights Watch) concerning the safety of witnesses and their treatment 
in Rwanda. The Tribunal gave much shorter shrift to the arguments of the Rwandan 
government, which also submitted an amicus brief in this case. The Tribunal reviewed the 
                                                          
64 Ibid paras 21, 29, 30, 43, 57.   
65 Ibid para 21. 
66 Ibid para 57. 
67 Ibid paras 21, 29, 30, 43, 57. 
68 Prosecutor v Taylor (Charles Ghankay), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Case No SCSL-2003-01-I, 
SCSL-03-01-I-059, ICL 25 (SCSL 2004), 31st May 2004, Appeals Chamber (SCSL) [Taylor]. 
69 Taylor, ibid paras 51 and 41. 
70 Para 41. 
71 Christine Chinkin, ‘Amicus curiae brief on protective measures for victims and witnesses’ submitted in 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1996) Case No. IT-94-1-T. 
72 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1996) Case No. IT-94-1-T at para 10.  
73 Ibid, at paras 39, 46, 47, 56.  
74 Prosecutor v. Fulgence Kayishema (Decision on the prosecutor’s request for referral of case to the republic of 
Rwanda, 16 December 2008) [Kayishema].  
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amicus submissions it had received in great detail,75 and relied heavily on them (the footnotes 
in the ‘discussion’ part are dominated by references to the various amicus submissions).76 
In the Laurent Gbagbo case,77 despite the defendant’s objections, the ICC decided to accept a 
request to intervene from a group of third-party amici. The Tribunal explained that the 
observations of the amici “appear to be of relevance”, and “may be desirable for the proper 
determination of the appeal.”78 The submissions of the amici were eventually not considered 
by the ICC’s Appeal Chamber,79 on the basis that the subject matter of the submissions was 
not up for discussion in the appeal process.80 Despite the decision of the Appeal Chamber, the 
decision of the Court to admit the amicus submissions shows openness in principle to this form 
of participation. 
Other examples exist of judicially-acknowledged amicus briefs, although in some cases only 
oblique reference is made to them in official documents.81 Our anecdotal, non-exhaustive 
review of the case law nevertheless suggests that third-party amici can have – and can be seen 
to have – real influence over the decision-making process in ICTs.  
III. DISCUSSION 
 
In a recent paper, Alter, Gathii and Hefler discuss the “backlash against international courts” 
in Africa, referring inter alia to the activities of foreign NGOs and their ‘western’ appearance 
as some of the reasons for certain African states’ attempts to curtail the operation of 
international courts:82 
“While these NGOs hire skilled human rights lawyers, they make easy targets for 
political leaders like Mugabe, who discredit them as thinly veiled fronts for Western 
                                                          
75 Kayishema, ibid paras 34-37. 
76 Kayishema, ibid paras 41-43. 
77 Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo (Decision on the “request to submit amicus curiae observations”) 
(2013) Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11 [Gbagbo amicus decision] 
78 Gbagbo amicus decision, ibid para 10. 
79 Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo (Judgement on the appeal of the prosecutor) (2013) Case No. ICC-
02/11-01/11[Gbagbo, Judgment on the appeal] 
80 Gbagbo, Judgment on the appeal, ibid para 54.  
81 Other more subtle references to amicus briefs can be found, for example, in Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo 
(decision from 15 June 2009) at FN 559.  
82 Karen Alter, James Gathii & Laurence Hefler, “Backlash against international courts in west, east and 
southern Africa: Causes and consequences” (2016) 27(2) The European Journal of International Law [Alter et 
al.] at 324. 
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nations seeking to interfere with the internal politics of African nations. The location 
of these foreign-funded NGOs in the more constitutionally progressive South Africa 
adds to this perception.” 
Could the preponderance of ‘foreign’ amici before ICTs be contributing to the type of backlash 
that Alter et al are concerned with? Further research would be required in order to give a 
meaningful answer to that question.83 There are plenty of other factors, far more central to the 
work of ICTs (e.g. decisions relating to indictments and sentencing) that are more likely – 
individually and cumulatively – to produce such a backlash. We nevertheless submit that it is 
important for ICTs to be mindful of the issue of representativeness when it comes to managing 
amicus participation, especially given the increase in amicus submissions in recent years and 
the fact that the sociological legitimacy of ICTs is so often called into question at a general 
level. 
The evidence suggests that ICTs, perhaps aware of their ‘image problems’, do tend to tread 
carefully in their management of third-party amici. Harnessing this valuable resource to 
improve the decision-making process, while ensuring that the process is open to a broad range 
of third-party actors, requires a delicate balancing of interests. In our final remarks we discuss 
some of the techniques that ICTs have employed for achieving this balance, and offer some 
suggestions for improvement.      
One of the most striking aspects of the practice examined in the preceding section is that most 
instances of ICTs engaging in detail with the submissions of third-party amici involve 
submissions by academic experts. Soliciting such submissions through direct invitation (as in 
Taylor) or indirectly (as in Blaskic) seems a valuable way of enhancing the efficiency of 
proceedings when complex points of law are at issue.  
The Blaskic approach arguably represents a useful middle ground between the rigidity of the 
‘invited expert’ model and the efficiency losses that might result from a general open-door 
policy for third-party amici. Moreover, if amici are aware that a certain court or tribunal is well 
disposed to receiving expert assistance in a certain case, but not in another case, they may be 
able to target their interventions more efficiently, for the benefit of all concerned.  
                                                          
83 Following the publication of the above-cited article, Karen Alter has said she plans to focus future work in 
this area on the ICC (see interview with Joseph Weiler, EJIL Live, August 2016: 
http://ejil.org/episode.php?episode=24 ). 
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Having said that, the academic experts who intervene as third-party amici by ICTs are 
overwhelmingly drawn from the Global North. To some extent this may reflect the 
geographical distribution of leading universities, but the ‘most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations’ are scattered around the various nations, and more could arguably be done 
by ICTs to reach out to a broader, more representative, pool of talent. 
NGOs seek to intervene as third-party amici with greater frequency than academic experts, but 
their submissions are not openly relied upon by ICTs to the same extent. This does not 
necessarily mean that the NGO submissions do not influence the minds of the judges. However, 
the fact that the submissions of NGO amici are – as a matter of record – less ‘visible’ than those 
of academic experts, is surely deliberate. It may be relevant in this regard that a 
disproportionate number of NGO amici are both foreign (vis-à-vis the communities most 
directly affected by the work of a given ICT) and from the Global North (although without 
interviewing judges on this issue it is difficult to say whether they are conscious of not wanting 
to fuel a representativeness deficit by relying openly on submissions by the likes of Redress or 
Human Rights Watch, even if such submissions have actually proved helpful in the 
determination of the case).  
International NGOs are themselves taking steps to address the representativeness deficit. 
Organizations such as Oxfam and Amnesty International are relocating to the Global South, 
partly with a view to enhancing their perceived legitimacy. Salil Shetty, Secretary General of 
Amnesty International, made the following statement concerning the organisation’s decision 
to establish headquarter in Nairobi:   
“This legitimacy, and an authority, that comes from voices within the countries 
concerned packs a … powerful punch for Amnesty … It’s easy for governments to 
dismiss human rights and say this is a western concept: but everything is totally 
different when you are there with people from the region – it really weakens the 
counter-argument.”  
NGOs looking to ‘be there with the people’ might consider involving local civil society more 
intensely when they intervene as amici before ICTs, perhaps through co-submissions with local 
organisations.  
From the perspective of ICTs, more could arguably be done to facilitate amicus participation 
by local civil society organisations. Indeed, such organisations could serve as vital bridges 
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between ICTs and the communities most directly affected by their work. ICTs have the 
resources and know-how to reach out actively to local constituencies, to keep them informed 
of developments and where necessary to provide administrative support and advice to persons 
and organisations from those communities who wish to participate in proceedings as amici. A 
dedicated Amicus Officer, a role that for a time existed within the ICTY registry, could be 
tasked with performing this function.  
A spike in local amicus participation would no doubt generate extra administrative burdens. It 
would however help to level the playing field between local and foreign entities that wish to 
intervene as third-party amici, and in doing so it would enhance the legitimacy of ICTs.  
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